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Abstract: We demonstrate the rst, to the best of our
knowledge, LBS client that safeguards user privacy
against non-trustworthy LBS servers. Our collabo-
rative approach allows the client to obtain responses
from its near-by peers rather than submitting the query
to the LBS. Our demo makes the user aware of her
privacy level and oers tunable user parameters. The
demo contributes a novel user-centric approach that
enhances privacy without altering the business model
of location-based services.
Introduction. Smart phone users are now oered localiza-
tion devices (integrated GPS receivers) or positioning ser-
vices (e.g., based on near-by infrastructure). This enables
a range of location-based services (LBS), allowing users to
submit queries on their points of interest (POI) when they
nd themselves in place and get the LBS server response.
The loss of privacy and even more dire consequences is the
ip-side of getting information when and where it is needed.
User queries provide sensitive information to the LBS provider,
which could be non-trustworthy, i.e., misuse or fail to pro-
tect LBS logs and cause a breach of user privacy. The user
could be tracked in time and space and even be identied
[1]. Worse even, learning that a user is away from her home
could allow a house break-in or a blackmail [2].
To enhance LBS user privacy, location samples could be
obfuscated [3], a trusted third party or a centralized proxy
run by the LBS could anonymize queries before passing them
to the LBS. Such approaches have a down-side, e.g., obfus-
cation cannot be eective against absence disclosure [4]; or
they require centralized intervention, or changes to the LBS,
with little incentive to be adopted.
Our Approach. Our main contribution is a novel collabo-
rative privacy protection mechanism: basically, a user device
can avoid disclosing private information (location and sen-
sitive information on the user's activities) if it can obtain
a response to her LBS query by near-by peers (i.e., other
reachable user devices) that have the sought information on
the POI. Our scheme leverages the abilities of contemporary
smart phones: they can establish ad hoc connections when
in range, beyond connecting to infrastructure (e.g., cellular
base stations and Wi-Fi access points).
We build a mobile proxy in each device that protects the
user privacy. Devices maintain a POI buer, checked for
available information when the user enters a query. If not
available, our mobile proxy broadcasts the query (i.e., the
region and information of interest) to other nearby devices.
If and only if none of those neighbors can provide the re-
quested information, the LBS is queried. Intuitively, our
approach eliminates a signicant part of queries to and thus
user information made available at the LBS. This prevents
or signicantly limits privacy breaches: the mobile device
can essentially \hide" from the LBS, while it can still obtain
promptly the sought information.
Implementation. We implemented our scheme on the Nokia
N810 and N900 mobile devices, and demonstrate it with the
Maemo Mapper. First, mobile devices contact each other
and the server via one WiFi interface, thus the mobile proxy
automatically switches from ad-hoc to infrastructure mode
(and vice-versa) to enable both peer-to-peer and LBS com-
munication (e.g., via an AP). Second, the mobile proxy can
connect to the LBS through the cellular interface, thus elim-
inating the need for WiFi mode switching and imposing a
negligible delay to connect to the LBS.
Our scheme does not mandate any real-time interaction
with the user. Our demonstration system oers features
for exibility and usability: (i) it displays a continuously
updated user privacy level metric, for the user to be aware of
how well she is \hidden" from the LBS; and it allows the user
to tune (ii) a peer-to-peer query response time-out, trading
o privacy protection for prompt data acquisition, and (iii)
a collaboration level, i.e., the extent (e.g., time, number of
times) the user wishes her device to respond to LBS queries,
to control personal cost.
Performance Evaluation. A poster with detailed simula-
tion results will show that few user collaborations can hide
a great amount of information and thus drastically reduce
the ability to track and eventually identify users or the their
absence. The collaboration cost (e.g., energy expenditure)
is also kept low, with each user servicing very few queries.
1. REFERENCES
[1] P. Golle and K. Partridge, On the Anonymity of
Home/Work Location Pairs, Pervasive, Berlin,
Germany, 2009
[2] URL: http://www.pleaserobme.com
[3] M. Gruteser and D. Grunwald, Anonymous Usage of
Location-Based Services through Spatial and Temporal
Cloacking, ACM MobiSys, New York, USA, 2003
[4] R. Shokri, J. Freudiger, M. Jadliwala, and J.-P.
Hubaux, A Distortion-based Metric for Location
Privacy, ACM WPES, Chicago, IL, 2009
